Unveiling the Tang Cat Km 44 Connection: Fresh Insights into Baron 52’s Crew Survival and Capture

This article builds upon our previous in-depth analysis, “Reassessing the Baron 52 Incident: Evidence for Survival, Capture, and the Imperative for Renewed Investigation” (available here: https://www.storiesofsacrifice.org/blog/reassessing-the-baron-52-incident/). In that post, we examined declassified NSA intercepts under REFNO 1983, which described the movement of four “pirates” (U.S. aviators) by Group 210 from Km 44 to Km 93 amid road difficulties. To fully appreciate the new evidence linking Km 44 to the Tang Cat area—strengthening the case for survival and capture, we recommend reading the original article first, as it provides essential context on the crash survivability, SIGINT details, and implicated PAVN units.

Image: NSA Translation of PAVN Intercept - 5 February 1973

Linking the Intercepts to PAVN Units and Locations: The Tang Cat Connection

Further analysis of PAVN order of battle (OOB) and declassified reports ties the intercepts directly to specific units and locations along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, strengthening the correlation to Baron 52. Group 210 is identified as the 210th Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) Regiment, subordinate to the 377th Air Defense Division, which operated in southern Laos to protect Trail segments from U.S. air interdiction. Lt. Col. Luong Khanh Van, referenced as “Mr. Van,” was a known PAVN political officer in this structure, responsible for prisoner handling and transfer to higher echelons like the 471st Division.

A key revelation is the role of Binh Tram 35 (BT 35), a logistical unit under the 471st Division, with its 1970 command post at Tang Cat in southern Laos. According to the declassified JTF-FA Report on Case 1437 (dated May 22, 2002, originally from a May 2001 investigation), BT 35 was responsible for an estimated 90-kilometer north-south stretch of Route 128, from Ban Bac (northern endpoint) to Tang Cat (southern endpoint and 1970 HQ location). The unit, operational from 1965–1973, included specialized subunits for vehicle transport (Battalion 41), anti-aircraft artillery, boat operations (Battalion 59), engineering (Battalion 372), infantry, communications, medical support, and epidemic prevention. Interviews with former PAVN members (e.g., Le Ky, Nguyen Tat Gioi as commander, Tran Duc as political officer) confirm the headquarters remained fixed at Tang Cat, with no reported changes. The report, an Information Report (IIR) focused on POW/MIA Case 1437 involving Lt. Col. William J. Brashear (still listed as MIA), provides limited order of battle details but underscores BT 35’s role in securing and transshipping supplies amid heavy U.S. bombing.

A critical link emerges from a 1970 incident at Tang Cat, detailed in a Vietnamese military article by Nguyen Van Trung (“Quên mình cứu đoàn xe chở xăng,” Quân Đội Nhân Dân, 2017). On January 2–3, 1970, BT 35 organized a gasoline convoy of four trucks from Battalion 59, each carrying 20 barrels (200 liters each). Political Commissar Nguyen Tuan (born 1922, Nghe An Province and mentioned in the JTF-FA report) rode in the lead truck. Departing at 18:00 on January 2, the convoy reached the Tang Cat chokepoint at Km 48 around 03:00 on January 3, where U.S. aircraft detected and bombed it. The lead truck ignited, blocking the road. Tuan heroically directed drivers to save cargo, pushing unburned barrels roadside until engulfed in flames and collapsing. Recollections from comrades Ho Van Lien (Planning Assistant, BT 35) and Nguyen Duy Tam (Commander, Engineer Battalion 41) highlight the site’s vulnerability and Tuan’s sacrifice, per Command 559 regulations requiring senior officers on convoys.

This places Km 48 explicitly at Tang Cat, suggesting the “44” in the Baron 52 intercept refers to a nearby location—potentially just 4 kilometers north within the same BT 35-controlled segment of Route 128. The intercept’s description of Group 210 (210th AAA Regiment) moving four “pirates” to “Mr. Van” (Lt. Col. Luong Khanh Van, associated with prisoner handling) from 44 to 93 aligns geographically: Km 93 (still under review) is possibly located at the Route 9 intersection near Xepon (Tchepone), a northern chokepoint under BT 31. The “difficulties moving along the road” reflect the Ho Chi Minh Trail’s rugged, bomb-cratered terrain in this area, exacerbated by ongoing U.S. interdiction.

PAVN sketch maps (below) from publications like “Strategic Transportation Lines (1967-1968)” (pp. 376-377 in History of the People’s Army of Vietnam, Vol. II-Book 1, 1988) depict Tang Cat Noi south of Bac (Ban Bac), near Salavan and Chavane, with pipeline route numbers (e.g., 54-65) indicating logistical waypoints. A topographic map overlay shows Ban Bac north, the Baron 52 crash site centrally marked near Tang Cat, and Chavane south, confirming proximity.

Image: PAVN sketch map illustrating Route 128 segments, with Bac at the top, Tang Cat Noi labeled, and points like Xa Nac, Ban Phon, Salavan, and Chavane. Route numbers (54-65) indicate pipeline logistical waypoints.

Image: Topographic map of southern Laos showing Ban Bac (north), Baron 52 crash site, Tang Cat (marked near the crash), and Chavane (south). Note the Trail routes weaving through mountainous terrain.

This Tang Cat connection bolsters the intercept’s credibility, as BT 35 would coordinate with AAA units like the 210th for security and potential prisoner transfers. The 1970 incident at Km 48 demonstrates the area’s strategic importance and frequent U.S. targeting, mirroring the conditions during Baron 52’s mission. Combined with no other U.S. losses and the intercepts’ temporal match, this raises the capture probability to Very High, underscoring the need for targeted VNOSMP inquiries into BT 35 veterans alongside the 210th, 377th and 471st. 

Updated Recommendations: Incorporating Tang Cat Leads

In light of the Tang Cat evidence, expand VNOSMP collaboration to include 1972-1973 era BT 35 veterans (e.g., via PAVN veteran associations). Prioritize interviews on 1973 Trail operations in BT 35 AOR near Km 44-48, prisoner handling protocols, and interactions with Group 210.

Additional References:

22. JTF-FA. (2002, May 22). IIR on Case 1437 - Limited Order of Battle Information on BT 35 and BT 36 (Corrected Report). (REFNO 1437 - Tang Cat Reference.pdf) https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/frd/pwmia/503/160850.pdf
23. Nguyen Van Trung. (2017). Quên mình cứu đoàn xe chở xăng [Forgetting Oneself to Save the Gasoline Convoy]. Quân Đội Nhân Dân. http://sknc.qdnd.vn/ky-niem-sau-sac/quen-minh-cuu-doan-xe-cho-xang-503067 (Tang Cat Nguyen Tuan Article Translation.pdf)

Media References:

1. Atherton, H. (2023, January 27). 50 years later, peace treaty that was supposed to end Vietnam War still haunts my family. USA Today. https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/voices/2023/01/21/vietnam-war-paris-peace-accords-remember-baron-52/11021128002/
2. McLaughlin, K. (2025, February 2). What happened to the crew of a U.S. spy plane shot down by North Vietnamese? The War Horse. https://thewarhorse.org/what-happened-to-crew-of-us-spy-plane-shot-down-by-north-vietnamese/
3. Wetterhahn, R. (2023, February). ‘All of Them Needed to be Dead’: An Air Force surveillance plane crashed in Laos the week after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords. The fate of the crew still is unknown. VFW Magazine. https://www.qgdigitalpublishing.com/publication/?i=773598&p=30&view=issueViewer
4. Lodewyk, G. (2025, June 12). Story man seeks truth about brother’s Vietnam War disappearance. The Sheridan Press. https://www.thesheridanpress.com/news/local/story-man-seeks-truth-about-brother-s-vietnam-war-disappearance/article_844ea4f8-549d-4e27-8d8f-83eea5b84b42.html
5. Bear, J. (2023). Baron 52 MIA Mystery Docu Series Podcast [Audio & Video podcast series]. Stories of Sacrifice. https://www.storiesofsacrifice.org/categories/baron-52/
6. Bear, J. (2025, July). Baron 52: A Family’s Half-Century Fight for Truth Against Bureaucracy and Greed. Stories of Sacrifice. https://www.storiesofsacrifice.org/blog/baron-52-a-familys-half-century-fight/